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1. INTER-CONTINENTAL
INVASIVES: ECOLOGICAL AND
HUMAN HEALTH
One of the classical proverbs of ecol-
ogists is that everything is connected to
everything else. Though something of an
overstatement, this proverb is true often
enough to bear recalling. Increasingly, for
better or for worse, it is proving true with
links between ecological and human
health, links that tie local to global events,
in both nature and culture. We start first
with invasives, of which pandemic
pathogens are a subset.
Other species increasingly exploit
human capacities for world travel and
trade, often to become invasive and dis-
ruptive of ecosystems. Exotic plants, espe-
cially those r-selected in their native habi-
tats, can have characteristics that make
them weedy, rapidly multiplying on the
disturbed soils of civilization [1-3].
Similarly, exotic insects, microbes, and
fungi can become pathogens in native
plants at levels that make them, in effect,
pandemics [4]. Anticipating new pan-
demics that threaten human health, we
should consider parallels in natural
ecosystems.
The balsam woolly adelgid (Adelges
piceae), which co-exists more or less
peacefully with the silver fir in Europe,
was accidentally brought to New England
on nursery stock. It reached the southern
Appalachians in the 1960s and in three
decades decimated the Fraser fir (Abies
fraseri). The pathogen has killed 95 per-
cent of the mature trees in the Great
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A pandemic is a human medical problem but must be understood at multiple levels.
Analysis of social and commercial forces is vital, and, more comprehensively, an ecologi-
cal framework is necessary for an inclusive picture. Ecological health webworked with
political and social determinants surrounds issues of human health. In this constellation of
both natural and social factors, ethical concerns will arise at these multiple levels, from
human health to the conservation and health of wild nature.Smoky Mountains National Park, which
contained three-quarters of the spruce-fir
forest in the southern United States. There
may be as many as 50,000 adelgids on a
single tree. The fir trees are also stressed
by airborne pollutants, which compounds
the epidemic [5].
More recently, the hemlock woolly
adelgid (Adelges tsugae), from Asia, has
now appeared and threatens to become
pandemic on Eastern hemlock, posing the
greatest threat to Eastern forests since the
chestnut blight.
Foreign viruses and microbes that
land in New York or Los Angeles are sim-
ilarly invasive, except that they upset
human health in cities, rather than the
health of the land [6]. Against a constant
background of common infections, epi-
demics have periodically emerged over the
course of civilization, as with the Black
Death of the 14th century. These potential
pathogens were once rather limited by dis-
tances, since few of them are highly
mobile on their own. They often remained
local or regional.
But humans now provide transporta-
tion by jet plane or ocean freighter
halfway around the globe in a few hours or
days. Often the spread of a pandemic can
be traced from airline hub to airline hub [7,
p. 245]. Although foreign viruses and
microbes are not highly mobile on their
own, many of them did evolve to travel on
birds, which are highly mobile [8-10].
That suggests a connection between birds,
especially waterfowl, and the microbes'
capacity to travel on our jet planes. These
microbes evolved to do well on hosts that
fly great distances. The West Nile virus
infects more than 30 NorthAmerican mos-
quito species, which together transmit the
infection to at least 150 bird species, many
of which migrate [11].
Such pathenogenic invasives also
often prove to be opportunists in moving
from the birds and animals in which they
formerly co-existed as parasites over mil-
lennia to the human populations, which
become their new environment. The 1918
flu epidemic that killed 40 million people
is known to have originated in birds [12].
Further, as we next see, the contagion
escalates with crowding, both of animals
and of people. Pathenogenic microbes can
evolve rapidly (much more rapidly than
plant invasives) and are quite versatile. In
their former ecologies, there had been time
for co-evolution between parasite and
host, often producing non-pathological co-
existence and not infrequently symbiotic
relations [13]. Even in humans, most inter-
nal microfauna is harmless. But exposure
to novel pathogens can prove as hazardous
to humans as adelgids are to fir.
Globalism sets up atypical ecological
conditions favorable for invasives and
pathogens alike. The result is human dis-
ease, but the inclusive framework is social
upset of ecologies. When we disturb land-
scapes, we invite species that become
weedy, and hence the escalating problem
of invasive species. With epidemic and
pandemic diseases, there is a parallel
process at the microscopic level. We dis-
turb the ecology, and the microfauna, too,
become (so-to-speak) “weedy,” especially
the pathogenic ones. In fact, the parallel
processes are often linked, from ecosystem
to microbial scales, global to local [14].
The 1998-1999 Malaysian Nipah
virus epidemic emerged when pigs (raised
for international trade) were crammed
together in pens located in or near
orchards. The orchards attracted fruit bats
whose normal habitats had been disrupted
by deforestation; their droppings con-
tained the as yet unknown paramyxovirus
and infected the pigs. The overcrowding
led to explosive transmission rates and to
infections in pig handlers. So a virus that
was once not disruptively epidemic
became so because of human disruptions
of natural habitats of bats and overcrowd-
ing of pigs, driven by global commercial
interests. The Malaysian government
culled over 1 million pigs [7, p. 243; 15].
The ecological upset from deforestation
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pathogens and the threat of transporting
such disease globally. The bats are also
sold in markets in China to be eaten and
used in traditional medicine. When the
human health problem is so tied into forest
ecosystems, stressed by global trade in
timber, complicated by global meat mar-
kets, any analysis will be inadequate that
sees the problem as a virus in the bats.
More recent examples are SARS and
avian flu in Asia, Ebola in Africa, and the
continuing spread of BSE† (bovine
spongiform encephalopathy, which may
cause Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease) through
Europe and later North America. As we
see in more detail below, these diseases
share a worrisome characteristic, their
capacity to cross the Darwinian divide
between animals and people, and this is
favored by the disruption of the ecosys-
tems in which they evolved. They are
opportunists at exploiting rapid transporta-
tion, stressed under the pressures of global
trade.
The larger framework, suggest two
veterinarians at the Wildlife Conservation
Society, requires thinking holistically
“based on the understanding that there is
only one world — and only one health”
[16, p. 50]. That links conservation con-
cerns and medical concerns, in what is
now called “conservation medicine” [17].
“Health effects ripple throughout the web
of life. Health connects all species” [18, p.
9]. Human health requires thinking in eco-
logical contexts, increasingly in more
global ones. This further suggests more
inclusive ethical concerns: Global, inter-
national, and interspecific, beyond the
immediate protection of human individu-
als from disease. Developed countries,
which may have thought themselves pro-
tected with their high technologies and
advanced medical systems, discover they
are still linked with health, human and ani-
mal, to the developing world, even to wild
nature, and vulnerable to disruptions there,
to which they may also be contributing.
2. ESCALATING CHANGES
VS. GLOBAL PRECAUTION
The more massive the manipulative
power, the nearer industry and agriculture
approach the carrying capacity of the com-
mons, the more the unintended, amplify-
ing consequences are likely to be far
reaching. When the first New England set-
tlers set about to build a new world cul-
ture, theirYankee ingenuity in farming and
business posed little threat to the ozone
layer, about which they knew nothing.
Twentieth century manufacturers of
aerosol fluorocarbons have endangered
that protective layer. Early Virginia farm-
ers hardly knew that the South Pole exist-
ed; modern agribusiness in the South can
use DDT that makes its way into penguins
in Antarctica. This escalating power to
introduce changes at global levels shifts
the burden of proof and increases the bur-
den of precaution. When the possible
adverse results of introducing the change
are more irreversible than not doing it, the
burden of proof shifts to those who wish to
introduce changes.
Increasingly, the social, political, and
commercial forces driving globalism are
inadequately related to the determinant
biological forces, from global biosphere
levels to microbial levels [14, 16, 17]. One
might have hoped that as human techno-
logical, industrial, agricultural, and med-
ical competence increased, risks would
diminish. Food safety inside developed
nations has increased, for instance. Yet as
the depth of upset advances even more,
across the spectrum from global to micro-
bial processes, there are unintended conse-
quences that accompany the intended con-
sequences.
Human power to produce changes
increasingly overshoots human power to
foresee all the results of these changes.
The latter takes much more knowledge.
Chemists knew how to make Kepone but
were unable to predict what it would do in
the ecology of the James River estuary
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um and make reactors but could not pre-
dict where the mutagens in the tailings
would end up and what biological damage
would result in wildlife and in humans
[21]. Such chemists and engineers might
be lucky, but often not. Serendipity is rare
in highly manipulative technology.
The United Kingdom BSE Inquiry
Report to the House of Commons con-
cluded that those who authorized feeding
cattle recycled meat and bone meal
(MBM) remains from sheep and cattle
ought to have anticipated trouble with the
effort “to turn grass-eaters into cannibals,”
feeding them food that cattle did not
evolve to eat.They ask “why those respon-
sible for the practice of using MBM in cat-
tle feed did not foresee that this might be a
recipe for disaster.” “What went wrong
was that no one foresaw the possibility of
the entry into the animal feed cycle of a
lethal agent far more virulent than the con-
ventional viral and bacterial pathogens,
and one which would be capable of infect-
ing cattle despite passing through the ren-
dering process” [22, vol 1, p. 226-227]. To
put this bluntly: If you try to make carni-
vores out of herbivores, you can expect
upsetting surprises.
Agribusiness can build battery farms
and raise 100,000 chickens in dense space,
aware of the needed nutrients and antibi-
otics to keep the chickens marketable but
has proved unable to predict what
pathogens would infect the chickens when
and where. In developing nations, this may
depend on the extent to which chickens are
exposed to wild birds in markets, includ-
ing the illegal trade in wild birds, which
may extend to developed nations. In
October 2004, avian flu (H5N1 type A
virus) was found in two crested hawk-
eagles that were smuggled from Bangkok
into Brussels in an air traveler's carry-on
baggage, destined for a Belgian falconer
[23].
In complex systems, blending social
and biological forces, at global to micro-
bial ranges, disrupting evolutionary
ecosystems, introducing rapid changes,
driven by commercial interests, ignorance
is likely to outpace knowledge. Outcome
is often quite different from intent. One
ought increasingly to slow down the intro-
duction of potentially more potent novel
changes with adequate precaution and
pretesting. The unforeseen consequences
outnumber the foreseen consequences, and
the bad unforeseen consequences outnum-
ber the good unforeseen consequences,
especially when one is massively upset-
ting ecosystems and massively moving
organisms around on the globe, both those
that humans intend to move (legally and
illegally, chickens and the hawk-eagles)
and those they do not (the flu virus).
Precaution is demanded but, with
such complex interconnections, permitting
the trade under what is hoped to be suffi-
cient precaution is at times unrealistic. The
global surveillance system is incompetent
for such oversight. Once again, economic
and political factors mix with biological
monitoring, as often to prevent as to facil-
itate collaboration. Agencies responsible
for human health differ from those respon-
sible for livestock health; often there is no
agency charged with monitoring wildlife
health [24]. There are frequent “institu-
tional or diplomatic constraints that do not
permit the dissemination of critically
important ‘unconfirmed’ information on
disease outbreaks” [25, p. 983]. There are
documented delays as long as seven weeks
between recognition of pathogens and
international reporting [26]. In view of the
“just-in-time” delivery system (see
below), millions of animals will have been
transported in this period.
The needed surveillance is likely to be
institutionally impossible in developing
nations with meager health care resources,
where outbreaks often start. Developing
nations may have no such systems in
place; international organizations no
authority to intervene. Under agreement
with member states, the World Animal
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mation on wildlife diseases unless such
information has been sanctioned by a
national agricultural authority, which may
not have such expertise [16, p. 50].
Developed nations monitor livestock
and food commerce within their borders,
but not overseas origins, which is not
within their jurisdiction. Agencies have to
respect national borders; pathogens do not.
Surveillance, domestic or international, is
piecemeal; nobody has this scope of vision
or authority. “No organization has the
mandate to pursue policies based on a sim-
ple but critically important concept: that
the health of people, animals, and the envi-
ronment in which we live are all inextrica-
bly linked” [16, p. 39].
This situation is likely to generate
mismatches between free-market econom-
ics and the biology of pathogens.
Economists do not tend to think biologi-
cally. Those who are pushing to develop
the economy, to exploit new markets and
new products, do not have a precautionary
mindset. Of course there will be the usual
assurances of improved surveillance,
tighter regulations, and more rigorous
safety inspections. This will increase the
bureaucracy. Especially when there is
alarm, no one in government agencies in
charge of food or medical safety wishes to
admit they cannot improve control and
surveillance [22]. Meanwhile, the drive to
maximize profits continues.
Despite the U.K. experience, the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, though it
has proposed some prohibitions, particu-
larly of brain and spinal materials, still
permits feeding animal proteins to live-
stock. The FDA and the meat industry
remain “totally committed to continuing
the practice of feeding slaughterhouse
waste to cows.” A ban on feeding all ani-
mal protein to livestock, an FDA
spokesperson says, would be “a big
expense for the industry.” This comes, of
course, with simultaneous FDA reassur-
ances that the new prohibitions will
“remove 90 percent of potentially infec-
tious matter from all animal feed” and that
this “reduces a very, very low risk even
lower” [27]. Remembering how, as one
critical summary of the U.K.’s Phillips
report put it, the cattle were fed the animal
protein, the “nation fed a diet of reassur-
ances” [28], one wonders whether to trust
the experts and, if they are right, whether
low, low risk of a pandemic disease is
acceptable.
Dealing with the possibility of intro-
ducing new diseases, one might have
hoped that what one ought to do will coin-
cide with what one should prudently do.
This has proved so with culling after dis-
eases are found and a threat becomes high
profile. The Malaysian government culled
more than 1 million pigs to stop the Nipah
virus. Efforts to control the spread of avian
influenza in Asia have required culling
more than 140 million chickens. But there
are factors that decouple the two.
In addition to the difficulty of predic-
tion, there is likely to be a lag time; the
intended consequences of changes will be
immediate and obvious; the unintended
consequences do not show up for five or
10 years. The latency period for BSE, for
example, is typically five years and initial-
ly strikes a single cow in a herd [22, vol 1,
p. 20]. When pathogens begin to be sus-
pected, what is going on is initially diffi-
cult to find out. Masked palm civets were
first thought to be the reservoir of the
SARS coronavirus; now the reservoir
seems to be bats [15]. The role of migrat-
ing wild birds in the transmission of avian
influenza compared with that of commer-
cially transported chickens is under debate
[23]. By the time researchers can prove the
transmission routes, in both ecosystems
and world trade, the pathogen is already
widely present. The harm is likely to be
done in another region, probably another
nation, from that where the initial care
needs to be exercised. Predictions are the
more unreliable and suspect because there
is little previous experience. The organ-
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ments. Such factors make adequate pre-
caution increasingly unlikely in times of
escalating change. Again, this suggests
increasing ethical concern.
3. CAPITALIST OVERSHOOT AND
SYSTEMIC OVERSTRESS
There is a momentum in capitalism
that tends to overshoot. In any comprehen-
sive view of sustaining health, from ecosys-
tems to microbes, wild nature to human
society, one has to factor in a capitalist ten-
dency to overshoot. Capitalists want to
operate, as economists say, “at the margin.”
Although in commerce that has a technical
meaning, it also means that capitalists will
stress the limits of their productive systems.
Trouble is likely even when engineers oper-
ate technical systems at the edges of their
capacities, though the specifics are unpre-
dictable.Think of the brownouts and black-
outs in overloaded electricity grids, when
some unexpected voltage surge does not
trip but blows a safety switch and this trig-
gers system failure.
When commerce encounters ecosys-
tems, there is more of this more risky oper-
ating “at the margin.” Capitalist systems
will push natural systems to their limits.
One always hopes for a better crop this
year, with a better seed and new fertilizer.
One hopes for a better fishing season, with
biggernetsandbetterelectronicgear.When
there is a run of good years, the producers
expand, buy more land, tractors, and new
fishing boats, and get ready for another
good year. But then comes a run of dry sea-
sons, bad fishing seasons. The business
operators cry for help. The government
intervenes to subsidize, adjusts interests
rates, changes tax rates, lest companies
fold, jobs be lost, and the economy take a
down turn. The push is as much to sustain
profits as to sustain ecosystems [29-31].
That pressure, generic to capitalism,
amplifies the risks when applied to animal
and human health, especially in the global
food trade. Retailers and manufacturers
seek their products and raw materials
where they are cheapest, and that is not
likely to be where health safeguards are
maintained. The food trade has increasing-
ly developed a “just-in-time” network of
delivery to the supermarket chains [32].
Consumers want their bananas ripe and
tasty, and this requires delivering them to
the supermarket “just-in-time,” else they
are too green or too full of black sugar
spots to delight the customer. Likewise
with fresh meat and produce flown across
oceans and delivered the day before it is
sold. The customer is satisfied; the whole-
saler saves cost of inventory and ware-
housing. But this will stress inspection sys-
tems that need time to be more cautious.
Combine that with maximally prof-
itable sales “at the margin,” and the food
delivery system is likely to overshoot the
productive capacities of agricultural sys-
tems and to discount safety measures, per-
haps in ignorance of the increased risks.
This will be all the more true with unseen
microbial diseases and their vectors, with
a lag time of several years before becom-
ing symptomatically evident.
Many persons in business are paid to
introduce changes and new products, the
quicker the better. But few are employed
to foresee adverse consequences and cau-
tion against them. Some economists are
conservative; they take care to hedge their
bets. There is much talk of “sustainabili-
ty.”At the same time, in the market system
there is little pay attached to conservative
care, nor to rational consideration of the
best social options. There is no pay at all
attached to the defensive appreciation of
nature, although in these low-pay and no-
pay areas there is much at risk and much
of value to be defended. Checking these
economic pressures, a role of government
is to regulate and widen by law the margin
of safety and to assure the preservation of
environmental values. Caution is not only
prudent but a moral requirement in these
circumstances.
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reason to doubt whether the governmental
authorities have the expertise or resources
to deal with these kinds of problems early
on. Early warnings of caution will gener-
ate conflicts of interest. Governmental
authorities who deal with the problem will
be closely connected to the financial inter-
ests threatened [22, 28]. Politicians desire
a booming economy just as much as econ-
omists. Inside industry, no one wants bad
news, certainly not managers and stock-
holders, and also not labor and customers.
There will be some tendency to suppress
or delay, or disbelieve the warning signs.
There is an institutional tendency for bad
news, discovered or suspected down in the
shop or out in the field, to be suppressed as
it rises up the institutional hierarchy. The
bad seal on NASA’s Challenger 7 is a
famous example [33].
Recognizing such systemic stresses
and biases, especially as these involve
pandemic threats, it becomes more impor-
tant than ever to err on the safe side.Acrit-
ic here might reply that this tendency to
overshoot may be true in the broad market
sector, but is not true in health care,
whether in medicine or pharmaceuticals.
The usual complaint is the other way
around: government regulations prescribe
such a host of precautionary tests that it is
difficult to introduce a new drug on the
market. The regulating authorities are
quite conservative. Here many people are
paid to be cautious. In health care, practi-
tioners and suppliers are afraid of lawsuits
if they are not cautious.
But this care does not readily transfer
to the production of human food, or to the
commercial process that moves exotics
around. In the “just-in-time” delivery sys-
tem, stressed animals, some of whom have
traveled long distances, will be more sus-
ceptible to such diseases, and these
stressed animals are likely to be mixed in
pens and batteries with local and healthy
animals. Consumer desires for cheap and
tasty food override caution and care in
production [34]. The pressure to keep
cows in calf will add more stress. At this
point, whether or not one is concerned
about the stress (and resulting sickness and
suffering) of the animals for what they are
in themselves, one is concerned because
the stress is jeopardizing the safety in the
food-producing operation.
4. OVERKILL OF DOMESTIC AND
WILD ANIMALS
When systems tend to overshoot, their
operators are likely in result to be forced to
overkill. Once a disease is found unex-
pectedly in the animals, the danger hits the
press, and the regulatory authorities decide
to go safe, there is likely to be overkill.
Perhaps the overkill is justified by the
safety caution, given the unknown dan-
gers. But notice that, after the alarm, gov-
ernment authorities, now embarrassed, are
likely to wish to show their muscle, as
much to impress citizens, as to control the
epidemic. They are now watching the
spread of public opinion as much as of the
disease [22, vol 1, p. 98, pp 127-129]. In
choosing their strategies, they want to re-
assure the public and also to reassure cus-
tomers at home and abroad.
In any mass slaughter program to pre-
vent the spread of a newly found and
feared disease, by far the vastest number
of the slaughtered will be quite healthy
animals. Most of the slaughter will be on
suspicion or “just in case,” a thousand
cows for every one that has foot and
mouth disease. If the cull includes all the
animals on nearby farms as well (within
three kilometers in Britain), that will result
in devastating hardship on innocent own-
ers. Innocent owners may have little
choice once the cull policy is in place; the
policy is dictated. Or if not dictated, any
farmer with misgivings is shunned as
being unpatriotic; their cows may be killed
willy-nilly [34, 35].
The mass slaughter program kills,
probably by less than the most humane
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healthy animals. Most of the animals were
destined to be killed and eaten, of course.
But at least then some good would have
come of their deaths. In the cull, the ani-
mals are wasted. The U.K. killed 6 million
animals in the 2001 outbreak of foot and
mouth disease [36, 37]. In the BSE epi-
demic 170,000 cows died from BSE, and
another 4.7 million were killed in a pre-
cautionary slaughter, and over 140 persons
died from new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob
disease, contracted as a result of exposure
to contaminated meat [22]. One kind of
pressure, to have food fast and cheap,
pushed too far, results in another extreme,
massive slaughter and waste. Fear of
Asian flu led to culling of 20 million
chickens in eight nations [12]. Public
health is at stake, as authorities will cor-
rectly claim. But what drives the overkill
may as much be economic fears of indus-
try collapse. Certainly minimal killing and
concern for animal suffering is not an
issue.
Nor is the overkill simply among
domestic animals, since the wild vectors
of the disease now also fall under suspi-
cion. If waterfowl are sources of new
pathogens, one approach would be to exer-
cise much more care in allowing wild and
domestic fowl to interact. An equally
effective and perhaps cheaper plan would
be to kill the wild birds in the area. Often,
however, it is not known how a pathogen
is being spread, whether in wild popula-
tions or in domestic populations. In the
case of the H5N1 avian influenza virus,
both migrating wild and commercially
transported domestic birds are variously
implicated. The significance of the trans-
mission routes is still under debate.
Sorting out the vectors is difficult for com-
plex reasons. The disease spread poorly
fits the migration routes; migrating birds
are healthy enough to fly and typically
asymptomatic [23]. Culling wild birds
would be premature on the basis of present
knowledge.
Wild animals are estimated to be the
source of more than 70 percent of all
emerging human infections [24]. Culling
wild animals is more difficult, especially
in developing nations. But hunting pres-
sures on such animals may be increased.
Often the killing in the wild is by reverse
contamination. This spread of contagion is
a two-way street. Recent quantitative
analysis finds that anthropogenic introduc-
tion of pathogens (called “pathogen pollu-
tion”) may account for 60 percent of the
emerging diseases of wildlife [38].
Endangered wildlife populations can be
pushed to the brink of extinction by these
links generating new stresses as a result of
commercial pressures, and, under fear of
emerging pathogens, efforts in surveil-
lance and control [39].
5. BLAMING WILD NATURE?
Those who advocate precaution need
to use some additional precaution here. A
first line of precaution will argue that these
pathological organisms do come from wild
nature. Ecosystems are full of diseases and
we cannot let them spread into our human
cultures. So we must eliminate the natural
reservoirs. Facing the threat of pandemic
diseases, Andrew Dobson, an ecologist at
Princeton University, concludes that con-
servation biology has “almost as important
a role as medical schools.” He continues,
finding that there are two alternatives in
thinking of the disease etiology: “either to
reduce the prevalence of the pathogen in
the reservoir host, or to identify the condi-
tions that lead to spillover and attempt to
minimize these” [15, p. 629]. The first
tries to fix the problem by focus on the
reservoir in wild nature. The second fixes
the problem by focus on the upsets that
humans have introduced to trigger the pan-
demic and create a route for its spread.
The second level of precaution is to
avoid blaming wild nature for these dis-
eases, having failed to use adequate pre-
caution in our escalating disruptions of
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displaces wild animals, and the animals in
atypical circumstances may provide new
niches for their pathogens, or the displaced
animals may carry their pathogens to new
hosts, often domesticated animals.
Populations of humans or domestic ani-
mals exposed to new infectious organisms,
especially when crowded or stressed, may
develop explosive epidemics, although the
pathogen endemic in its original niche is
carried by its hosts at low-level and with-
out serious disease outbreak [40]. In natur-
al ecosystems, pathogens and parasites
are, for the most part, integrated into the
routines of these systems — although even
in wild nature there are occasional epi-
demics. But presumably these viruses and
microbes are adapted fits in the niches
they occupy in wild nature; the birds and
the wildlife have usually learned to live
with them [23].
When we humans move such organ-
isms into our global capitalist economies,
radically altering their habitats from any-
thing resembling an ecosystem, we might
first suppose that they will soon wither and
die. Many do. But, surprisingly, we are
now finding that we can also invite an
unprecedented explosion, a pandemic.
Since we create the context in which the
pandemic appears, one can as well say that
we humans create the disease as that the
disease originates in wild nature.
HIV/AIDS, before jumping to humans,
existed in primate populations in Africa,
with which it had co-evolved. It might
never have emerged as pandemic if it were
not for the social disruptions in post-colo-
nial and sub-Saharan Africa, with the
bush-meat trade; the movement of rural
populations to large and crowded cities,
caught in poverty there; with disrupted
family structures promoting promiscuity
and prostitution — all of which facilitate
HIV transmission [7, p. 243].
I began with analogy between aphids
killing fir and hemlocks and human pan-
demic diseases. I close with another anal-
ogy between ecosystems and pandemics.
On a field trip examining the aftermath of
the massive 1988 Yellowstone fires in the
company of fire ecologists, I asked
whether this or that fire was caused by
lightning or by careless humans. An ecol-
ogist replied: It makes no difference
whether the source of ignition was a
human match or a lightning bolt. The
cause of the fire was the overload of fuel
building up from decades of fire suppres-
sion. Yellowstone was a fire waiting to
happen; if a camper does not ignite it this
year, a lightning bolt will next year, or the
year after that. Put the lodgepole under
stressed fuel load, and you will get a fire,
later if not sooner.
Similarly with these pandemics.
Stress the chickens, stress the bats, stress
the pigs, stress the suppliers, stress the
markets, stress the crowded and poor, or
busy and fast-flying people, and you’ll get
a pandemic, later if not sooner. The cause
is not so much the microbe as the context
of “fuel load,” so to speak. The mismatch
between ecology and social matrix is a
pandemic waiting to happen.
The driving forces creating this com-
plex of problems have heavy momentum.
One ought to examine the prevailing prac-
tices actively and to counteract them con-
sciously. The economic juggernaut is cou-
pled with a political juggernaut to push for
development, growth, more and more for
less and less. Those who can see the inclu-
sive picture of how this affects global and
local health, human and ecosystemic, need
to shift the burden of proof on those who
wish to introduce more rapid changes and
to raise the standards of caution by push-
ing in reverse. There is no better way to
raise the alarm than to cry “one world, one
health.”
Do we not have an ethical responsi-
bility not to create diseases? Equally not to
create the context in which disease is like-
ly to happen? Does not the Hippocratic
Oath require, first of all, that we do no
harm? In preventing such harm, we do not
Rolston: Panglobalism and pandemics: ecological and ethical concerns 313always fault nature; more often we may be
able to learn from nature how better to fit
our economies in with the ecologies and
communities of life on Earth.
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